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ABSTRACT 
Thomas C. Kerr: Supplying Stalemates: The Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers to Violent Non-
State Actors 
(Under the direction of Navin A. Bapat) 
 
 
State sponsorship of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) has been shown to prolong intra-
state conflicts and increase the probability that intra-state conflicts escalate into inter-state wars. 
Previous academic studies have examined the logic underpinning state sponsorship but the study 
of the varying levels of support to different VNSAs states provide has not been fully explored. 
This study adds to the existing literature by demonstrating at what magnitude states will aid 
VNSAs under differing circumstances, specifically the lethality of arms supplied. Through the 
examination of three case studies, I determine that the primary determining factor is the ex-ante 
probability that the VNSA will be able to perpetuate the conflict. Significant to this study is the 
finding that VNSAs that are facing elimination may become the most dangerous in terms of 
weaponry capabilities as state sponsors provide more lethal armaments in an attempt to prolong 
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In August 25th, 2019, Yemeni Houthis launched ten ballistic missiles into southern Saudi 
Arabia targeting the Jizan airport. The attack killed and wounded dozens, both civilian and 
military (Heinrich, 2019). The Jizan attack is an indicator of the evolution of the over six-year-
old Yemeni conflict being fought by the Houthis and the Saudi led coalition that backs the 
internationally recognized government of Prime Minister Hadi. Over the past three years the 
Houthis have begun to target sites within Saudi Arabia proper, showing a willingness and 
capacity to take the fight across the Saudi border (Al-Jazeera, 2019). The Jizan attack marked a 
clear advancement in Houthi long-range targeting capabilities evolving the conflict from an 
intra-state civil war into a fledgling inter-state conflict.  
According to a United Nations Security Council report to the United Nations Secretary 
General regarding the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which 
explicitly bans Iranian arms transfers, the weapons used in the August 25th attack where 
undoubtedly of Iranian origin (UNSC S/2019/934, 2019). Iran is the Houthis’ largest supporter 
and is the main supplier of sophisticated weaponry to the group (CIA, 2021). Though both Iran 
and the Houthis are Shia, Iran does not support the Houthis for ideological reasons, rather Iran’s 
support is part of its regional strategic policy objectives, namely weakening the Saudi regime 
(Juneau & Razavi, 2013; Ostovar, 2019). The civil war in Yemen has become the front line in a 
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran for regional dominance in the Middle East with the 
Houthis being delegated the role of proxy. In the contestation for regional supremacy, Iran 
2 
currently does not have the capabilities to effectively confront Saudi Arabia directly; Iran must 
employ tactics that will weaken its adversary without escalating the conflict into a direct kinetic 
confrontation hence Iranian support for the Yemeni Houthis.  
Beginning in March of 2015 Saudi Arabia began a campaign within Yemen to reestablish 
the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Until this 
point, the Yemeni conflict was a contestation between the legitimate government located in 
Salah and the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels; Saudi Arabia only limitedly involved itself in the 
conflict via modest financial and arms transfers to Hadi’s forces (Allen, Burgess, Hubbard, 
Marcus, Peçanha, & Lai, 2016). During the initial stage of the conflict Iran was able to achieve 
its strategic objective of creating unrest in the region through small-scale arms transfers to the 
Houthis. Once Saudi Arabia became actively involved, the ability of the Houthis to continue the 
conflict was jeopardized. Accordingly, Iran began to provide increased arms capabilities to the 
Houthis in order to achieve its goal of prolonging the conflict. The relative support provided by 
Iran lays at the heart of this study. 
This study will examine the strategic logic states employ in deciding whether to, and at 
what magnitude, support Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA) organizations. The paper will consist 
of two sections: first a review of the relevant literature on the strategic logic of state sponsorship 
while the second section examines three case studies that provide a real-world context to the 
theoretical findings presented in the first section. The case studies: Iranian sponsorship of the 
Yemeni Houthis, Iranian sponsorship of Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iranian sponsorship of the 
Iraqi Kata'ib Hezbollah were chosen to allow for continuity of the sponsor thereby limiting 
variables so that the causal mechanism under study, the ex-ante probability of that VNSA will be 
able to perpetuate the conflict, can be isolated.  
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The Logic of State Sponsorship 
To understand the strategic logic of state sponsorship of VNSAs one must begin with 
clearly defining what is meant by state sponsorship. In the existing literature, two definitions 
have gained prominence. The first was put forth by Hoffman, who writing specifically on state 
sponsorship of terrorists, defines state sponsorship as “the active and often clandestine support, 
encouragement and assistance provided by a foreign government to a terrorist group (Hoffman, 
1998). The second definition, put forth by Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan 
expands upon Hoffman’s definition by including insurgencies that do not necessary employ 
terrorism as a tactic (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001). This paper will rely 
on the second definition due this study’s inclusion of VNSAs that do not employ terrorist tactics.  
At the basic level, sponsorship can be viewed through a patron-client understanding.  The 
patron (state sponsor) provides its client (VNSA) with support in exchange for the client’s 
willingness to act on behalf of the patron (Byman and Kreps, 2010; Salehyan, 2009; Salehyan, 
2010; Hughes, 2012; Salehyan, Siroky, & Wood, 2014; Groh, 2019). Clients understand that by 
solicitating external support they are agreeing to forfeit a certain amount of autonomy (Byman, 
Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; Bapat, 2007; Banks, 2012; Bapat, 2012; Bell, 
2018; Groh, 2019). This relationship is understood to be mutually beneficial, the client receives 
much-needed support in carrying out conflict, while the patron receives an additional instrument 
in which to use to achieve its foreign policy goals. With respect to strategic geo-political goals, 
sponsors view clients as a cost-effective tool for waging covert warfare against their enemies 
(Laqueur, 1999; Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; Gleditsch, Salehyan, & 
Schultz, 2008; Salehyan, 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011; Karlen, 2019). 
Collins claims that sponsors “often view terrorist [VNSA] clients as a force multiplier that can be 
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used to weaken and destabilize neighboring states, to project power into areas beyond the 
feasible reach of the state’s military forces, to topple rival regimes, and/or to control the 
opposition in target states” (Collins, 2014). 
In most of literature the cooperation between the VNSA and the potential state sponsor is 
assumed to be voluntary. This assumption has been criticized for oversimplifying interactions 
observed in the real-world. Young is one such critic who argues that actors face constraints in 
their decision-making processes stemming from power disparities between actors which can lead 
to cooperative regimes being “imposed” upon the weaker of the two parties (Young, 1982). 
Keohane also warns of the dangers of the volunteer assumption stating that researchers must be 
“aware that any agreement resulting from bargaining will be affected by the different opportunity 
costs of alternatives faced by the actors – that is, by which party has the great need for agreement 
with the other” (Keohane, 1984). With the disadvantages that VNSA’s face when cooperating 
with a state sponsor listed below, it becomes apparent that in this dyad the VNSA is the weaker 
of the two parties and their agreement to join such a relationship may not be purely voluntary.  
By delegating the task of engaging in irregular warfare to VNSA proxies, states gain 
three main benefits: plausible deniability, reduced cost, and the use of the proxy as a “bargaining 
chip” in their negotiations with their rivals. Plausible deniability is the most significant 
advantage in the use of proxies in carrying out irregular warfare; strategically states wish to harm 
their adversaries but rarely desire actual war (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 
2001). Engaging in irregular warfare tactics with a state’s own military force will likely escalate 
the rivalry into a direct inter-state kinetic confrontation, but clandestine support to proxy groups 
can gain the benefits of irregular warfare with a low probability of escalation, because proving a 
state’s sponsorship is difficult (Salehyan, 2009; Wilner, 2018). Plausible deniability is eroded 
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when sponsors begin to provide more advanced weaponry to VNSA clients. Unlike small arms, 
few states have the ability to manufacture advanced armaments thereby allowing these weapons 
to be more easily tracked back to their source. Intercepted arms transfers or wreckage recovered 
from impact sites allow for clear identification of the armament source (Gehrke, 2017). Though 
plausible deniability is eroded with the supply of advanced weaponry, target states are reluctant 
to initiate full-scale inter-state conflict in retaliation for proxy support because the cost of inter-
state conflict is simply too great (Byman, 2018).  
At the most basic level, sponsorship incurs financial costs to the sponsor such as the 
procurement of the weapons, training and equipping soldiers, or the transferring of funds. 
Though these financial costs may be significant, they are exponentially less than the cost of inter-
state warfare (Groh, 2010; Byman, 2018). It is estimated that Iran provides Lebanese Hezbollah 
with $700 million USD a year, approximately four percent of Iran’s 2020 defense budget of 
$15.8 billion USD (Levitt, 2019; Sheet, 2020). Furthermore, Iranian support to the Houthis has 
provided the regime with its greatest return on investment; it is estimated that Iran provides the 
group with $100 million USD a year whereas the Saudi expenditure in the conflict is 
approximately $6 billion USD a month and American support to the Saudi war effort is 
estimated to be $10-15 million USD a month (Oakford & Goodman, 2018; Allen & Riedel, 
2020). A relatively insignificant expenditure by the sponsor can incur great cost to the target 
state.  
States also have the incentive to sponsor VNSAs because these proxy groups can then be 
used as “bargaining chips” during negotiations with the target state (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, 
Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; Findley, Piazza, & Young, 2012). While researching the effect of 
safe havens on terrorist group survival, Carter found that sponsorship can make VNSAs more 
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susceptible to counterterrorism operations carried out by the target state. Carter finds that 
sponsors routinely aid the target government, either through intelligence sharing, allowing to 
target to carry out an operation in their territory, or by simply handing over members of the 
VNSA to garner goodwill from their rival or to gain diplomatic concessions (Carter, 2012). The 
sponsorship of VNSAs can also increase a state’s bargaining power through the negotiation 
technique known as “tying the hands.” By supporting a group to the level that the group in turn 
becomes a potential threat to the sponsor, a state can demand concession from their rival. The 
state can demand these concessions because by betraying a well-funded proxy, the sponsor is 
sure to incur costs; the sponsorship then becomes a “costly signal” that can decrease the 
commitment problem surrounding negotiations under the auspices of anarchy (Bapat, 2012).  
As mentioned above, when VNSAs agree to enter a patron-client relationship with a state 
sponsor, they are forfeiting some portion of their autonomy of behavior (Byman, Chalk, 
Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; Bapat, 2007; Bapat, 2012; Bell, 2018). Why then do 
groups agree to submit to such a subservient position? Ninety percent of VNSAs collapse within 
their first year and groups are aware of this extremely high attrition rate (DeVore & Stähli, 
2015). VNSAs understand that sponsorship provides the resources needed to survive and may be 
their only avenue to prevent collapse (Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; 
Blomberg, Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2011; Carter, 2012). Along with providing arms, logistics, 
funding, and safe havens, states can provide organizational support. States have experience with 
day-to-day management of a bureaucratic entity that most VNSAs are lacking. This 
organizational support allows VNSAs to gain the administrative knowledge necessary to 
effectively run an organization thereby increasing the likelihood of survival (Byman, Chalk, 
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Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001; Blomberg, Gaibulloev, & Sandler, 2011; DeVore & 
Stähli, 2015). 
In addition to the loss of autonomy discussed above, VNSAs may suffer other costs from 
entering a patron-client relationship with a state sponsor. The inherent clandestine nature of state 
sponsorship prevents VNSA clients from forming credible commitments with their patrons 
(Ritter, 2000; Wilner, 2018). Without warning, a sponsor may decide to no longer support their 
proxy and, except for attacking the former sponsor, the proxy has little to no recourse. 
Additionally, a sponsored VNSA is constantly threatened by the fact that the sponsor may 
choose to aid the target government in the elimination of the proxy. As detailed above, sponsors 
have several incentives to renege on their agreements with their proxies in to gain concessions 
from the rival government. This threat is especially pronounced when the proxy is reliant on the 
sponsor for a safe haven that acts as a base of operations for the VNSA (Carter, 2012). The fate 
of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) is an oft-cited case study of a sponsor 
cooperating with the hereunto target government in the elimination of the proxy VNSA. During 
the 1980s the JKLF waged an intense insurgency against India in the disputed Kashmir region 
with Pakistan as a prominent state sponsor (Tremblay, 2001; D'Souza & Routray, 2016; Phillips, 
2017). In the early 1990s the patron-client relationship began to deteriorate and in 1996, with the 
aid of information provided by the Pakistani ISI, the JKLF was effectively eliminated (Kanwal, 
1999; Carter, 2012; D'Souza & Routray, 2016).  
Sponsorship is not without inherent risks, foremost amongst these risks is the loss of 
complete foreign policy autonomy (Bapat, 2012; Salehyan, 2010; Groh, 2019). Due to the 
benefits of maintaining plausible deniability in their relationship with the proxy, sponsors are 
unable to take direct control of the group’s actions, creating the possibility that the proxy will act 
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outside of the wishes of the sponsor. A proxy’s autonomy of action becomes of particular 
concern for the sponsor when the preferences of the two groups are not perfectly aligned (Groh, 
2010; Wilner, 2018; Khan & Zhaoying, 2020). Bapat refers to the phenomenon as “moral 
hazard” whereas Salehyan categorizes this divergence in preferences once delegation has 
occurred as “agency slack” (Bapat, 2012; Salehyan, 2010). Agency slack creates two possible 
scenarios that would produce high costs for the sponsor. The first potential negative outcome 
resulting from agency slack is that the sponsor may be drawn into an outright conflict with the 
target state due to the actions of the proxy. The proxy may take actions that are outside of the 
agreed upon set of behaviors and that are so violent that the target government will have no other 
option than to punish the sponsor in retribution (Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008; Salehyan, 
2009; Bapat, 2012; Salehyan, Siroky, & Wood, 2014; Groh, 2019; Khan & Zhaoying, 2020). 
The second potential negative consequence of sponsorship due to agency slack is the proxy 
turning on the hereunto sponsor. Though a rare event, by using the increased capabilities 
provided by the sponsor the VNSA can inflict high costs to the sponsor. Increasing the risk of 
sponsorship, the threat of the proxy turning their weapons against their sponsor is not 
temporarily constrained to the period of active support, at any point in the future the VNSA may 
attack the former sponsor (Groh, 2019).  
In addition to the risks of conflict escalation and proxy ‘backstabbing’, potential costs of 
VNSA sponsorship include possible sanctions levied against the sponsor and a loss of 
international reputation (Groh, 2010; Schultz, 2010). State sponsors are aware that any form of 
support entails accepting an inherent risk of retaliation and calculate the retaliatory risks 
sponsorships entails prior entering the patron-client relationship. If a state believes the geo-
political gains of sponsorship outweigh the potential reprisal costs, then sponsorship is a rational 
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choice in carrying out foreign policy goals (Byman, 2018). “Many of the possible punishments 
are accepted in advance; making it less surprising that the application of these punishments often 
fails to change the sponsor’s behavior” (Bynam, 2005). That said, it is in the strategic interests of 
the sponsor not to enter a kinetic conflict with their rival state; if that were the case, they would 
employ their own military capabilities against the target government. State sponsors perform a 
balancing act between inflicting loss upon their rivals and limiting the probability of a retaliatory 
attack.       
Historically, studies on non-state actor external support have focused primarily on 
finances (Jonsson, & Brennan, 2014). These studies attempt to discover how rebel groups 
finance their operations and how they work to evade government interception of such finances 
(Aliu, Bektashi, Sahiti, & Sahiti, 2017; Freeman, 2011). Though financing is a vital aspect of 
VNSA operations, this research focus does not address they actual mechanics of VNSA success, 
i.e. kinetic action. When researchers do focus on weapons acquisition, they tend to focus on 
illicit small arms transfers (Arsovska & Zabyelina, 2014). Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, & 
Brannan so far as to say, “Small arms are any insurgency’s defining technology” (Byman, Chalk, 
Hoffman, Rosenau, & Brannan, 2001). This focus begins to address the actual mechanics of 
conflict, but no conflict has been decided using small arms alone (Asal, Conrad, & White, 2014). 
Rebel organizations must procure sophisticated weaponry if they are to succeed in fighting 
against a state military. VNSAs are forced to seek external support when they experience 
limitations on the procurement of sophisticated arms domestically (Asal, Conrad, & White, 
2014). These limitations may arise due to the lack of weapons manufacturing facilities in the 
territory the VNSA controls or due to government repression. In either case, the VNSA is unable 
to be self-sufficient in its armament procurement needs. Being that only states possess the 
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sophisticated military equipment that the VNSAs require, to achieve their armament needs they 
must seek state sponsorship (Asal, Conrad, & White, 2014). Though concentrating on potential 
transfers of nuclear material to terrorist groups, which is outside the scope of this study, Collins 
has found that though the number of sponsored VNSAs has decreased, the lethality of weapons 
supplied to groups that are sponsored has increased dramatically (Collins, 2014). 
State sponsors are in the business of selling stalemates. As discussed above, due to 
agency slack, sponsors do not necessarily wish to see their proxies achieve complete victory over 
the target government. To both maintain control over their proxy, and to inflict the greatest loss 
on the target government, state-sponsors provide weapons capabilities as the situation “on the 
ground” dictates. State-sponsors provide the minimum arms required to keep their proxies in the 
fight, thereby inflicting addition losses upon the target. If small arms are sufficient to keep the 
conflict underway, state sponsors will only provide the most basic of weaponry. When a state 
sponsor’s proxy is in danger of being eliminated by the target state, a sponsor must provide more 
advanced weaponry to prolong the conflict if they are to achieve the foreign policy goal of 
inflicting the highest cost possible on their geo-political rival. To further the discipline’s 
understanding the varying levels of support provided to VNSAs, the below case studies will 
concentrate on the lethality of weapon systems provided by state sponsors to proxy groups.  
Case Studies 
In the following section the theoretical concepts explored above will be applied to three 
case studies centering on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s support for VNSAs. Specifically, this 
study will focus on Iran’s support for Yemeni Houthis, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iraq’s Kata’ib 
Hezbollah. As stated above, the selection of cases studies with Iran as the sponsor of all three 
groups is intended to provide a consistent baseline to examine theorized behavior. Before 
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examining each conflict individually, an examination of Iran’s strategic goals is in order. Iran’s 
overall strategic ambitions are three-fold: counter the perceived military encompassment by the 
United States, achieve regional dominance over rival Saudi Arabia, and expand the 
religious/political ideology of the Iranian Revolution, all of which lend themselves well to the 
use of proxy VNSAs (Ostovar, 2019).  
Iran’s foremost foreign policy goal is to counter the perceived encirclement of Iran by 
American military forces. To counter the United States, Iran has instituted a foreign policy goal 
of creating what it has characterized as the “Shia Crescent” (Alsulami and Elghonemi, 2016). 
This expansion of regional influence is primarily achieved via the use of proxy forces to act as a 
buffer against US encroachment; Iran perceives these regional proxies as their first line of 
defense against the United States (Byman, 2012; Byman, 2015; Negahban, 2017; Al Mahmood, 
2017). “…militant clients are the only tool Iran has for extending its strategic footprint and 
directly countering its adversaries through armed force. For that reason, they have become the 
centerpiece of Iranian grand strategy…” (Ostovar, 2019).  
Iran’s second major foreign policy priority, which is closely related to its first, is Iran’s 
ongoing competition with Saudi Arabia to achieve regional dominance. This rivalry goes beyond 
the Sunni-Shia divide, and is primarily centered around economic, military, and political 
interests. Militaristically, Iran is ill suited to compete with Saudi Arabia. As a prime beneficiary 
of the United States, along with its position as the foremost oil exporter, Saudi Arabia has access 
to and the means to pay for, the most sophisticated military equipment on the global market. In 
contrast, Iran has been mostly cut-off from acquiring modern weaponry through the imposition 
of sanctions aimed at curbing Iranian military might, most notably Iran’s nuclear program. Iran 
must rely primarily on domestic production of military hardware which simply cannot compete 
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with technologies produced by the United States (Ostovar, 2019). To close this gap in 
conventional military capabilities, Iran employs its cadre of VNSAs as a cost-efficient means of 
projecting its military influence throughout the region (Ostovar, 2019; Kagan, Kagan, & Pletka, 
2008).  
Iran’s third strategic foreign policy initiative, which can be considered to encapsulate all 
its foreign policy, is the spread of the religious and political ideology of the Iranian Revolution 
(Al Mahmood, 2017). According to Alsulami and Elghonemi, “Iran has adopted the principle of 
Lebensraum used by Hitler in the Second World War” (Alsulami and Elghonemi, 2016). This 
principle, which relies on spreading ideology to the region’s Shia population as a primary means 
of expanding political and military influence, is best witnessed through Iranian support of 
VNSAs to create the aforementioned “Shia Crescent” (Al Mahmood, 2017). Through the spread 
of the ideology of the Revolution, Iran creates clients that are not only dependent on Iranian 
military support but are also indoctrinated to use their operations to spread Iranian ideology 
(Ostovar, 2019). In creating proxies that are dedicated to the same ideological foundations of 
Iran itself, Iran is attempting to reduce the risk of experiencing the above-mentioned inherent 
risk in state sponsorship known as agency slack or moral hazard (Negahban, 2017). Lebanese 
Hezbollah, which was created by Iran for the specific goal of acting as a bastion of the 
Revolution the in the Levant, is Iran’s foremost success in this endeavor (Kagan, Kagan, & 
Pletka, 2008). Kata’ib Hezbollah is less ideologically oriented that Lebanese Hezbollah but is 
fervently dedicated to the Iranian regime (Hussein, Jedinia, & Lipin, 2019; Knights, Smith, & 
Malik, 2021). The Yemini Houthis are an exception to this policy, Iran has spent little effort in 
indoctrinating the Yemeni Houthis as it recognizes such efforts are unnecessary to achieve its 
goals (Ostovar, 2019).   
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Yemeni Houthis 
Before the current civil war, Iran had limited influence in Yemen (Kleemann, 2019). 
Though both the Iranian regime and the Houthis are Shiite, each adheres to a different subsect of 
the religion which has resulted in the Houthi denial of Iran’s Supreme Leader as their religious 
and political authority (Ostovar, 2019). Unlike Lebanese Hezbollah, where Iran holds nearly 
absolute influence, the patron-client relationship between Iran and the Houthis is tenuous. 
Throughout the conflict the Houthis have been known to attack targets that do not directly 
correspond with Iranian objectives (Kajo, Jedinia, & Ahn, 2019). This agency slack is a result of 
the non-voluntarist nature of the relationship; the Houthis do not have an alternative source of 
arms procurement. If an alternative source presented itself, especially if the source is closer in 
ideology, the Houthis would readily break the patron-client relationship with Iran (Ostovar, 
2019).  
Strategic interests bring Iran and the Houthis together, despite their religious differences; 
both are staunch opponents of Saudi Arabia, and both hold strong anti-American sentiments 
(Ostovar, 2019; IISS, 2020). Since the beginning of the Yemen Civil War, Iran has been 
providing increasingly sophisticated weaponry to the Houthis (Gehrke, 2017; Kleemann, 2019). 
Interdictions against Iranian arms shipments to Yemen have seized weaponry including assault 
rifles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, rocket launchers, rocket propelled grenades, unmanned 
aerial vehicles, and unmanned surface vessels (CAR, 2016; CAR, 2017; Kajo, Jedinia, & Ahn, 
2019; Shay, 2017). As the conflict escalated and the Saudi response became more robust, Iran 
began providing more lethal weaponry. These weapon systems provide a relative increase in 
capability allowing the Houthis to continue their fight against Saudi Arabia. On September 14th, 
2019, a spokesman for the Yemeni Houthis claimed responsibility for a drone attack on the Saudi 
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Aramco oil refineries of Abqaiq and Khurais (Jaffe, 2019). The attack temporarily caused a 
nearly fifty percent decrease in Saudi oil exports, over five million barrels a day (Said, 
Malsin, & Donati, 2019). The attack also generated the largest price jump in crude trade 
futures on record (Jaffe, 2019). The 2019 attack on Saudi oil refineries indicates a dramatic 
increase in the level of support Iran is willing to provide to the Houthis. Though Iran is 
supplying increasingly sophisticated weapons to the Houthis, Iran’s strategic goal is to act as a 
“spoiler” and prolong the conflict to extract as much cost out of its rival Saudi Arabia, not to aid 
the Houthis to achieve a complete victory (Kajo, Jedinia, & Ahn, 2019; IISS, 2020). 
Due to strategic interests in the conflict zone, the United States has been actively engaged 
in the Houthi-Saudi conflict. Two vital and interconnected interests compel the United States to 
become involved in the conflict: US reliance on Saudi oil exports and the importance of the Bab 
al-Mendeb to international shipping. Saudi Arabia possess a fourth of the worlds proven oil 
reserves and has the lowest extraction costs of any OPEC member (Bahgat, 2003). The United 
States averages an importation of 450,000 barrels of Saudi crude oil a month, by far the most of 
any OPEC country and only surpassed by Canada for sales to the United States (EIA, 2020). 
Under the current U.S. energy policy, the United States has no viable alternatives to its reliance 
on Saudi oil (Bahgat, 2004; Aarts, & van Duijne, 2009). Noel characterizes U.S. policy towards 
Saudi Arabia as having the objective to “sanctuarize” the petro-monarchy against any external 
threat and “to prevent the heart of the world oil system from being caught up into the regional 
political instability” (Noel, 2007). In exchange for a consistent supply of inexpensive oil, the 
Saudi regime can rely on Washington to serve as its ultimate guarantor of its security (Aarts, & 
van Duijne, 2009; Shay, 2017). 
15 
The strait of Bab al-Mandeb is a strategic chokepoint for global maritime shipping.  It is 
the third most traveled waterway for oil transportation with over 3.3 million barrels of crude oil 
passing through the strait each day. Additionally, nearly 12 percent of the international trade 
passes through the Bab al-Mandeb (al-Suheimy, 2018). Since the commencement of the Yemeni 
conflict in 2015, most of Yemen's Red Sea coastline, including the Bab al-Mandeb, has been 
under Houthi control (Shay, 2017; IISS, 2020). In September and October 2016, two US 
warships, the USS Mason and USS Ponce, were targeted by missiles fired from Houthi 
controlled territory. In response, the USS Nitze launched Tomahawk missiles at Houthi targets 
north of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Slavin, 2016; Shay, 2017; Ostovar, 2019). Following the 
cruise missile strikes, Vice Admiral Scott A. Stearney, Commander US Naval Forces Central 
Command, went on record to say, “We will counter any threats to protect our interest and 
safeguard maritime trade within the Bab al-Mandeb” (Baswaid, 2018).  
The United States has been providing both direct and indirect aid to the Saudi regime 
since nearly day one of its six-year struggle with the Houthis. US aid primarily takes the form of 
military hardware sales, including precision-guided bombs, Black Hawk helicopters, and the 
anti-missile system THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) (Zavis & Ahmed, 2017). 
THAAD is of special significance due to the system’s ability to detect and neutralize Iranian 
supplied ballistic missiles launched from Yemen. The US also provides intelligence sharing that 
is vital to arms shipment interdictions as well as providing mid-air refueling support to Saudi 
fighter jets (Zavis & Ahmed, 2017). The United States is also actively engaged in arms transfer 
interdictions independent of its coordination with the Saudi regime (Shay, 2017). U.S. warships 
routinely patrol off the coast of Yemen in an attempt to prevent Iranian arms from reaching the 
Houthis.  
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Lebanese Hezbollah  
Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran’s most well-known and hereunto effective Iranian proxy 
group. Most analysts agree that of Iran’s proxies, “none is more important to Tehran than 
Lebanese Hizballah” (Byman, 2005). Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran and so closely associated that 
some analysts remove the proxy term from the group and categorize Lebanese Hezbollah as a 
foreign deployed wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, henceforth referred to as the 
IRGC (Kagan, Kagan, & Pletka, 2008; Lucic, 2009; DeVore & Stähli, 2015; Negahban, 2017; 
Levitt, 2019). This intrinsic relationship showcases Keohane’s critique of the voluntary 
association assumption in theoretical models (Keohane, 1984). The argument can be made the 
Lebanese Hezbollah’s cooperative regime with Iran was imposed upon the group rather than 
entered voluntarily. “Tehran exercises almost complete control over the organization. This 
relationship allows Iran to use Lebanese Hizballah as it would its military and at the same time, 
maintain a level of deniability when confronted with international pressure over the group’s 
actions” (Manni, 2012). Iran’s almost completely control the decision-making process within 
Lebanese Hezbollah has effectively removed any threat of agency slack. 
Iranian financial aid and arms transfers are estimated to be worth $700 million USD 
annually (Levitt, 2019; Ostovar, 2019). The Middle East Media Research Institute has published 
reports that it believes that Iran has transferred to Lebanese Hezbollah approximately 11,500 
missiles and rockets, short and medium-range pieces artillery, SA-7 anti-aircraft systems, and C-
802 anti-ship cruise missiles (Kagan, Kagan, & Pletka, 2008). Though Iran has transferred some 
of its most advance weaponry to Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran recognizes the group cannot win an 
outright kinetic confrontation with Israel, its primary opponent. The United States has sold Israel 
advanced weaponry worth billions of dollars including anti-missile technology and F-16 fighter 
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jets (Berrigan & Hartung, 2002). But a complete Lebanese Hezbollah victory is not Iran’s goal; 
rather Iran strives to create a stalemate between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah (Lucic, 2009; 
Manni, 2012; Khan & Zhaoying, 2020). The simmering conflict between Lebanese Hezbollah 
and Israel allows Iran to extract costs from Israel while minimizing the risk of a conventional 
inter-state kinetic confrontation. Iran’s strategy hereunto has been a resounding success; though 
Israel has warred repeatedly with Lebanese Hezbollah, Israel has not engaged in an overt 
conventional conflict with Iran despite Tehran’s proven massive financial and military support 
for Lebanese Hezbollah (Byman, 2018). 
Iraqi Kata'ib Hezbollah 
Kata’ib Hezbollah (Brigades of the Party of God) was formed in 2007 as an Iran-
sponsored Shiite paramilitary group in Iraq primarily tasked with engaging U.S., Iraqi, and allied 
forces (Hussein, Jedinia, & Lipin, 2019; Knights, Smith, & Malik, 2021). In 2009 the U.S. State 
Department designated the group as a terrorist organization and named the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) as the group’s sponsor (Hussein, Jedinia, & Lipin, 2019; 
BBC, 2021; Knights, Smith, & Malik, 2021). The U.S. Military Academy's Combating 
Terrorism Center estimates that the group controls nearly 10,000 fighters (Hussein, Jedinia, & 
Lipin, 2019; Alaaldin, 2020).  
Kata’ib Hezbollah was Iran’s primary militant group in Iraq from its formation but 
temporarily declined in 2020 following the killing of the group’s leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis 
in the American strike that also killed IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani (Jahanbani, 
2020; Knights, 2020). Additionally, during this same timeframe the United States and Iraqi 
forces initiated a new campaign of increased counterterrorism operations in the region where 
Kata’ib Hezbollah is most active (Alaaldin, 2020; Knights, 2020; Jahanbani, 2020; Knights, 
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Smith, & Malik, 2021). The combination of the killing of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and the 
increase in counterterrorism operations reduced Kata’ib Hezbollah’s ability to protract the 
conflict with the United States. This decrease elicited a corresponding increase in the amount and 
lethality Iran provided to the group. With the increased lethality of the weapons available to the 
group, coupled with the reorganization of the group’s chain of command following the death of 
al-Muhandis, Kata’ib Hezbollah is again Iran’s primary asset in operations against the U.S. in 
Iraq and is at the forefront of American threat assessments (Knights, 2020).  
Evidence of increased Iranian support for the group, as shown by Kata’ib Hezbollah 
suspected involvement in the May 2019 drone attacks on Saudi Arabia, shows that the group is 
once again Iran’s primary asset in Iraq and is now expanding its area of operations to support 
other Iranian foreign policy goals (Knights, 2020). Kata’ib Hezbollah’s modus operandi is rocket 
attacks on U.S. installations such as the March 2020, attack on Camp Taji, which killed two 
American troops and one British soldier (Alaaldin, 2020 Knights, 2020; Lopez, 2020; Loveluck, 
2020; Davison, 2021). 
Iran provides both financial and armament support to Kata’ib Hezbollah. Since the 
formation of the group, estimates place Iranian financial transfers to the group at more than $100 
million USD (Hussein, Jedinia, & Lipin, 2019; Knights, Smith, & Malik, 2021). Though the 
financial support is substantial, Iranian support for Kata’ib Hezbollah is primarily through arms 
transfers. Since 2019, confirmed arms shipments include rockets of ranging from 107mm- to 
240mm-caliber, Manportable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and anti-materiel rifles 
(Knights, 2020; Lopez, 2020). Though when compared to American weapon systems this 
armament is rudimentary, as the above analysis shows these systems can be employed to inflict 
substantial causalities.  
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Iran’s is cognizant of the fact that Kata’ib Hezbollah has no hope in achieving an outright 
victory over American and Iraqi forces; and indeed, that is not the Iranian goal. The purpose of 
Iran’s support to Kata’ib Hezbollah is sustaining the instability status quo within Iraq to increase 
costs to the American war effort (Alaaldin, 2020). Kata’ib Hezbollah attacks on the U.S. create a 
situation where American military decisionmakers believe that American forces must remain 
within Iraq to prevent a security void from forming and to prevent further increases in Iranian 
influence in the region (Hussein, Jedinia, & Lipin, 2019; Alaaldin, 2020; Knights, Smith, & 
Malik, 2021). Iran’s support of Kata’ib Hezbollah is remarkably effective in achieving this goal. 
Following the attack on Camp Taji, the United States announced that two carrier strike groups 
that were scheduled to depart the area of operations would remain on station (Lopez, 2020). 
Operating a carrier strike group is extremely expensive, calculating the cost of an associated 
carrier air wing, five surface combatants and one fast-attack submarine, and the approximately 
6,700 sailors to crew them, it costs an estimated $6.5 million USD per day to operate each strike 
group (Hendrix, 2013). By forcing the United States to keep the carrier strike groups on station, 
within two weeks Iran has caused the United States to spend more on its naval deployment alone 
than Iran has spent in fourteen years of supporting Kata’ib Hezbollah. 
In addition to combating American and Iraqi forces, Iran employs Kata’ib Hezbollah to 
achieve other foreign policy goals. Recently the group has been operating primarily in the Qa’im 
and Bukamal regions which are vital to maintaining Iran’s land corridor to the Syrian border 
which Iran uses to transfer personnel and materials to reinforce Iranian forces operating in Syria 
and its client Lebanese Hezbollah (Khaddour & Hasan, 2020; Knights, 2020). This land corridor 
is an integral component to Iran’s strategic goal of creating the “Shia Crescent” referenced above 
(Alsulami and Elghonemi, 2016; Al Mahmood, 2017).  
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Policy Relevance 
The above findings have significant policy relevance with regards to military strategy and 
conflict resolution efforts. The analysis shows that VNSAs that are threatened with elimination 
may become significantly more lethal in their capabilities if the group’s sponsor is dedicated to 
preserving their proxy. Military decisionmakers and localized commanders need to take this fact 
into account when conducting their final offensives. Additionally, the monitoring and 
interdiction of arms transfers at the end-stage of conflicts takes on added significance. If the 
advanced weaponry the sponsor attempts to transfer in the late stage of the conflict is intercepted 
the probability of reaching a settlement to the conflict increases being that the VNSA will no 
longer have to ability to sustain operations; policymakers must not reduce interdiction efforts 
prematurely. 
Further Research 
The theoretically findings of this study require empirical testing. This empirical testing 
will require the creation of a “lethality index” of the weapons that have been supplied to Violent 
Non-State Actors. Some work has been done in this regard but the current databases report on 
the weapons systems employed by various groups, but the datasets do not provide a measure of 
lethality. In addition to the lethality index, a system of measurement on the probability of a Non-
State Actor’s survival will need to be created. The survival probability is vital to understanding 
the level of support that will be offered to the group.  
Finally, a closer examination of the causal mechanisms that allow Non-State Actors to 
succeed without state sponsorship will need to be conducted. As referenced above, a great deal 
of literature has been written explaining why Non-State Actors seek state sponsorship even when 
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the negative effects of such a relationship are known. Little research has been devoted to 
understanding the decision-making process of Non-State Actors when considering accepting 
sponsorship or not, though it has been suggested that groups consider the credibility of the 
potential sponsor (Kydd 2005; Lake, 1999).  
Conclusion  
This study has added to the existing literature on state-sponsorship of VNSAs by 
determining the theoretical levels of support that states will provide to proxy groups. Through 
the above case studies, I have found that state-sponsorship support levels are primarily driven by 
the perceived likelihood that the state proxy will be successful in maintaining combat operations 
against the target government; groups facing elimination will receive more advanced weaponry 
while groups with higher probabilities of success eliciting lower levels of support. This finding 
conforms to the existing literature on state sponsorship in that within the patron-client 
relationship the sponsor’s preference is to prolong the conflict to extract as much cost from their 
rivals as possible.  
The three case studies above provide insights into Iranian strategic calculations regarding 
the lethality level of the armaments it supplies to its proxies. I have shown that an integral 
component of this strategic calculus is the perceived probability that the VNSA will be able to 
sustain combat operations against the target government. As the analysis shows, Iran’s 
sponsorship of proxies throughout the Middle East and Central Asia is aimed at maintaining 
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